基于信号博弈的中外资银行信贷竞争行为分析  

Analysis of Chinese-Foreign Banks Lending Competition Behaviors Based on Signal Game

作　　者：刘立安[1] 傅强[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2010年第1期25-28,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372041)

摘　　要：在银行业全面开放及贷款利率市场化条件下,本文利用信号博弈模型,讨论了信息差异及经营成本差异,对中外资银行信贷合约竞争行为的影响。结果表明:1)中资银行的竞争优势是老借款人。2)外资银行提供分离合约时,在中资银行的新借款人市场上将出现"柠檬效应";外资银行提供混同合约时,中资银行将失去所有新借款人。This paper constructs a theoretical model to analyze the influence of different information and operating cost to Chinese-Foreign banks lending competition behaviors using signal game model under the conditions of the fully open banking sector and interest rate liberalization. It shows that Chinese bank＇s credit market of new borrowers will present ＂Lemon Effect＂, when the foreign bank offer separating contracts to borrowers. And if foreign banks offer pooling contracts to borrowers, Chinese bank will lose all of new borrowers.

关 键 词：中外资银行 信贷竞争 利率市场化 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]