基于利润分配的制销供应链联盟安全责任策略  

Safety Responsibility Strategy of Manufacturer-Retailer Supply Chain Alliance Based on Profit Distributive

作　　者：孟炯[1,2] 唐小我[1] 倪得兵[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054 [2]西南科技大学经济管理学院,绵阳621010

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2010年第1期124-128,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70702025);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20060614023);科技部科技基础性工作专项项目(2007FY140400)

摘　　要：从企业社会责任的一个方面——产品的安全性能对消费者的影响入手,运用博弈论的基本思想,对制销供应链联盟的利润分配模型及其履行安全责任的策略进行了研究。结果表明:厂商可以通过对分配因子的选择,确定产品的批发价,从而实现利润的分配;供应链上游g类厂商能否较好地履行安全责任,并将履行安全责任的信息通过g类制销联盟有效地传递给消费者,经安全责任差异化产品,进而影响消费者偏好,是实现上游厂商、中游分销商和下游消费者帕累托最优的关键。Starting From one perspective of the corporate social responsibilities （CSR） -the product safety, and its influence on the consumers, applying the basic idea of game theory, the essay studies on the model for profit distributive of manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance, and the strategy for supply chain＇ fulfillment of safety responsibilities. The results show that firms can determine wholesale price through selecting β, thereby realize profit allocation; the key is to optimize the pareto for supply chain＇s up-stream firms and middle-stream retailers as well as down-stream consumers is signaling up-stream g firms＇ fulfillment of safety responsibilities through g manufacturer-retailer alliance to the consumers, and the influence on the consumer＇s preferences by making the products differentiate on safety responsibilities.

关 键 词：制销供应链联盟 安全责任 消费者偏好 利润分配 博弈论 

分 类 号：F406.18[经济管理—产业经济]