监管政策、审计师变更与后任审计师谨慎性  

Audit Regulation, Auditor Switching and Successor Auditor Conservatism

作　　者：黄崑[1] 张立民[2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院 [2]北京交通大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2010年第1期65-74,64,共11页Auditing Research

摘　　要：本文以我国2001～2002年出台的相关审计监管政策为例,讨论审计监管对审计师变更和后任审计师谨慎性的影响。由于证监会2001年发布的《公开发行证券的公司信息披露编报规则第14号—非标准无保留审计意见及其涉及事项的处理》(以下简称14号文)增强了非标审计意见之于上市公司的不利后果,因此可能推动了机会主义审计师变更的增加。我们发现,在14号文出台后,前期非标审计意见同审计师变更的正相关关系变得更为紧密,且大所向小所的审计师变更频率显著上升。但是,没有证据表明,相比于未变更公司而言,变更公司的后续审计意见改善程度更高。并且,在2000～2002年,后任审计师针对变更公司的谨慎性有逐渐增强的趋势,这意味着2002年中注协关于审计师变更的监管政策可能发挥了一定的积极作用。This paper examines the impact of the audit regulation policies on auditor switching and successor auditor conservatism from 2000 to 2002. Due to increased adverse consequences of modified auditor opinions （MAOs） created by Document number 14 promulgated by the CSRC, the probability of auditor switching motivated by management opportunism may increase. Our evidence shows that, following the passage of Document number 14, the relation between MAOs and auditor switching is stronger, and the frequency of auditor switching that the director is from a lager to a smaller auditor is increased. However, there is no evidence that audit opinion is improved for a switching company than a non-switching company. Additional, the conservatism of a successor auditor become more increased during 2000-2002. This evidence suggests the auditor switching regulation launched by the CICPA play the positive role in controlling the successor auditor behavior.

关 键 词：监管政策 审计师变更 审计意见 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]