发电商不正当竞标行为分析及综合评判  

Analysis and comprehensive judgement of illegitimate bidding among power suppliers

作　　者：高晓虎[1] 张少敏[1] 邹粤[1] 李峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学计算机科学与技术学院,河北保定071003

出　　处：《电力系统保护与控制》2010年第5期56-59,72,共5页Power System Protection and Control

摘　　要：分析了电力市场环境下发电商不正当竞标报价现象,考虑了影响不正当竞标的竞争者数量、市场份额、负荷弹性等多种因素,并对发电商的报价和容量进行了分析,设计了发电商报高价的不正当合谋竞标行为识别的综合评判算法。分析过程中运用了关联性分析、市场集中度和量价指数等多种方法,并加入隶属度函数衡量各影响因子代表的发电商合谋报价可能性的程度,最后应用模糊加权平均模型进行了发电商合谋判定。通过算例求解证实了该算法的可行性。This paper analyzes the phenomenon of illegitimate bidding among power suppliers. Taking various factors that influence bidding such as number of competitor, market share and load elasticity into consideration, the paper analyzes the quoted price and capacity of power suppliers, and proposes a comprehensive evaluation algorithm to recognize the illegitimate bidding behaviors where power suppliers act as conspirators and quote high prices. In the analysis, various methods such as correlation analysis, market＇s concentration degree and capacity price index are used, with membership function introduced to quantify the degree that each factor represents the possibility of power suppliers＇ conspiracy. Finally, fuzzy weighted average evaluation model is adopted to judge the conspiracy. Case study proves the feasibility oftbe proposed algorithm.

关 键 词：不正当竞标 合谋 竞争 电力市场 发电商 判别算法 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]