地方公共品有效供给的激励模型——基于中央与地方政府博弈的视角  

Incentive Model on Effective Supply of Local Public Goods——On the View of the Game Between Central Government and Local Government

作　　者：庞娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]广西财经学院经济系,广西南宁530003

出　　处：《改革与战略》2010年第3期25-29,共5页Reformation & Strategy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目<基本公共服务均等化与西部民族地区公共服务提供机制创新研究>(批准号:08XMZ012)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：当前,我国地方政府在事权和财权上都有了较大的自主权。在地方公共品供给中,当地方政府和中央政府目标不相一致时,中央和地方的博弈便不可避免。在政治与经济双重竞争的博弈背景下,地方政府作为公共品主要提供者的角色常常被忽视了,地方公共品供给出现结构失衡。因此,在中央与地方博弈的视角下,针对我国地方公共品供给的困境,研究地方公共品有效供给的激励模型,规范地方政府行为,形成地方公共品有效供给的激励制度是当务之急。China＇s local government has greater autonomy both in financial and administrative power. When the local government and central government has different targets, there is game between them. On the dual game of politic contest and economic contest, the role which local government is the main suppler of local public goods is usually ignored, and there is structural imbalance in local public goods supply. Therefore, it is urgent to research the incentive model on effective supply of local public goods on the view of the game between central government and local government, to norm of local government behavior and to establish the incentive institution of local public goods effective supply.

关 键 词：地方公共品 博弈 激励模型 

分 类 号：F120[经济管理—世界经济]