企业集群共性技术合作创新后的道德风险治理  

Governance of Moral Hazard after Cooperation Innovation about Generic Technology in Enterprise Cluster

作　　者：赵骅[1] 魏宏竹[1] 王金山[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《评价与管理》2010年第1期27-31,46,共6页Evaluation & Management

基　　金：重庆市软科学基金:重庆市工业园区企业集群技术创新能力提升的内外部机制设计;项目编号CSCT2009CE9071;2009.3~2009.12;国家863计划子项;高新技术产品研发与商业化的前置条件研究;项目编号2006AA04Z369-1;2006.9~2009.9

摘　　要：企业集群共性技术合作创新成功后,群内企业的行动选择有两种:遵守合作合约规定和采取机会主义行动。对于由价值链上的关联企业组成的企业集群,参与合作的集群企业自己的行动选择对其本身没有消极影响,本文通过有限静态博弈分析得出了没有采取机会主义行动的企业如何应对其他企业机会主义行动的策略;对于由具有竞争关系的企业组成的簇式集群,群内参与共性技术合作创新的企业自己的行动选择对其本身有负面影响,本文通过委托代理理论建立了最优惩罚契约模型以防范机会主义的产生。after success of cooperation innovation about generic technology, every enterprise has two options： abide by provisions of cooperation contract and take action of opportunistic. So, in enterprise cluster which was composed by non-competitive enterprises, when the action took by cluster enterprises has no Negative impact, the paper used fi- nite static game to analyze how to deal with opportunistic behavior of other cluster enterprise for enterprises which do not have opportunistic behavior. In addition,in the cluster that was composed by competitive enterprises,where the action selected by cluster enterprise has negative impact, the paper set up a punishment contract model to prevent opportunistic behavior through Principal-Agent Theory.

关 键 词：企业集群 共性技术 合作创新 道德风险 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F273.1