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作 者:董晓岩[1,2]
机构地区:[1]东北财经大学,辽宁大连116025 [2]浙江省国家税务局,浙江杭州310006
出 处:《西安财经学院学报》2010年第2期66-70,共5页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics
摘 要:征税人与纳税人在税收博弈中存在两种信息不对称:纳税人占信息优势的信息不对称和征税人占信息优势的信息不对称,前者可能导致纳税人的纳税不遵从,后者则可能导致纳税人纳税不遵从和征税人征税不遵从。信息不对称条件下税收管理的基本框架是:对于前者,税收管理的重点在于加大税收控管(包括税源监控、税务检查和税收处罚);对于后者,税收管理的重点在于优化纳税服务(包括税收宣传、纳税咨询和税务行政救济),最终达到消除或缓解征纳双方的信息不对称,提高征纳双方的税收遵从度,保证纳税人依法纳税和征税人依法征税的目标。There are two kinds of asymmetric information between tax collectors and taxpayers. The first is taxpayers having more information than tax collectors, and the other is tax collectors having more information than taxpayers. Both of them were harmful to tax compliance. The basic frame of tax administration under asymmetric information is: under the former circumstance, the main focus of tax administration should be put on tax supervision and management; and under the latter, the main focus should be put on taxpayer service. In these ways, the goal of eliminating asymmetric information and oromoting tax comolianee could be attained.
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