天然气管道运输中两阶段动态博弈定价模型  

Two-stage dynamic game-pricing model for natural gas pipeline transportation

作　　者：司江伟[1,2] 陈月璇[2] 丁浩[2] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京210098 [2]中国石油大学经济管理学院,山东东营257061

出　　处：《中国石油大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第1期170-174,共5页Journal of China University of Petroleum(Edition of Natural Science)

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金项目(Y2008H38)

摘　　要：利用两阶段动态博弈理论,对天然气管道运输行业自由竞争、税收调整、存在交叉补贴、政府限价4种情况下的博弈定价进行研究,并讨论不同情况下的价格与各参数之间的关系以及不同的政府行为对价格的影响。结果表明:自由竞争和固定税收对定价无影响;交叉补贴会导致价格上升,不利于市场发育;政府限价是较为可取的常规管制方法。所得结论可为其他具有部分公益职能的企业产品定价提供理论依据。Using two-stage dynamic game theory, the game pricing under the conditions of free competition, taxation adjustment, cross-subsidies and government＇s limiting price was investigated for natural gas pipeline transportation industry. The relation between prices of different conditions and each parameter and the effect of different government behavior on price were also discussed. The results show that free competitions and fixed taxes have no effect on pricing. Cross-subsidies would lead to higher price that is not beneficial to market growth. And the government＇s limiting price is the most conventional control. The conclusion can provide theoretical basis for natural gas pipeline transportation and other product pricing of partial commonweal function.

关 键 词：天然气 管道运输 定价 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]