分析现象学的过去  

The Past of Analytic Phenomenology

作　　者：颜青山[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系,上海200241

出　　处：《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2010年第2期22-27,共6页Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助"分析现象学:基于哲学史的问题研究"(08JA720009)

摘　　要：如果"分析现象学"真正的开端是现象学立场在心灵哲学中的运用,并且,如果它仅仅被看作是分析哲学与现象学的融合形态或桥梁形态,那么",分析现象学"的过去则与分析哲学和现象学的历史一样长。这个过去应该包括分析哲学和现象学早期的广泛互动(例如胡塞尔与弗雷格、罗素与梅农、摩尔与布伦塔诺、赖尔或卡尔纳普与胡塞尔之间的互动)与后期的分道扬镳(根源于石里克对胡塞尔、卡尔纳普对海德格尔的著名的批评)。If the application of phenomenological standpionts to the philosophy ot mind starts the real thstory oI analytic phenomenology, which is now broadly understood as a bridge between the analytic philosophy and the phenomenology movements, it has had a relatively long past that is the same length as both histories of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. This past should have included their positive interactions, e.g. between Frege and Hussed, Menoning and Russell, Brentano and Moore, Husserl and Ryle or Carnap, in the earlier stage （before 1930）, and the fission which are rooted in the attack of Shlick on Husserl, Carnap on Heidegger as well.

关 键 词：分析哲学 现象学 分析现象学 过去 

分 类 号：B089[哲学宗教—哲学理论]