我国转轨时期税收腐败的委托代理理论分析  

Principal-agent Theory Analysis of the Taxation Corruption in China

作　　者：郝文娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《科学技术与工程》2010年第8期1919-1924,共6页Science Technology and Engineering

摘　　要：政府的税收要靠政府委托征税人向纳税人征收,在这个过程中,由于纳税人对自身的收入拥有私人信息,纳税人可能会逃税,又由于征税人可以比政府掌握更多关于纳税人收入的信息,征税人可能会接受纳税人的贿赂帮纳税人逃税。针对我国的税收腐败和税收流失现象,政府的税收机制用委托代理理论模型化。分析指出,使政府净税收收入最大化的最优税收机制是存在的。尽管征税过程中征税人可能会腐败,但政府通过选择一定的税率、监督概率、惩罚率和奖励率等,实现最优税制,会使征税人腐败的收益与不腐败的收益无差异。The tax is collected by the government delegating tax collectors to tax on tax payers. In this process, since tax payers have personal information about their own incomes, they may evade tax. And tax collectors may receive bribes from tax payers to help them avoid taxation, because of the government knowing less about tax payers＇ incomes than the tax collectors doing. To counter the phenomena of taxation corruption and tax evasion in China, using Principal-agent theory to model the government＇s taxation mechanisms. That is pointed out there exists the optimal taxation mechanism maximizing the government＇s net revenue of tax. Although the tax collectors may corrupt in the process of taxation, the government can choose certain tax ratios, supervision ratios, fine ratios and award ratios to realize the optimal taxation mechanism, making the tax collectors＇ utilities indifferent between corruption and incorruption.

关 键 词：税收腐败 委托代理 税收机制 道德风险 逆向选择 

分 类 号：F812.422[经济管理—财政学]