最优贿赂、腐败与矿难事故的内生性——解释与防治矿难的经济模型  

Optimal Bribery,Corruption and the Endogenous of the Mine Crisis——An explanation and governance of the mine crisis

作　　者：王天龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学公共管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2010年第2期119-125,共7页Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：根据国家安监总局的观点,重大矿难事故背后往往存在安全生产监管部门官员的失职渎职以及权钱交易、官商勾结等腐败问题,从这个角度出发,构建了一个存在贿赂和腐败行为的矿难事故模型。研究表明,通过考虑矿主与负有资源矿安全生产监管职责的官员之间的博弈,可以得到矿主的最优贿赂额。通过引入时间因素,将矿难事故的概率内生化。从而最优贿赂额、资源矿的安全生产标准、官员腐败被查处的概率、腐败的成本、资源矿的收益等一系列因素都将系统影响矿难事故的发生,并据此提出防治矿难事故的政策建议。This paper sets up an economic model to study the mine crisis and try to offer some advices on how to avoid the mine crisis. According to the view of state administration of work safety, behind the serious mine cri- sis, there are always some delinquencies, the dereliction of duty and corruptions. From this point of view, we tried to set up a model conclude these phenomena. The study shows that, the game between the boss and officer will have an optimal solution, namely optimal bribery. By introducing the time factor, we may investigate the endoge- nous of possibility of the mine crisis. Thus optimal bribery, safety standard of mine crisis, the possibility of being investigated when the officer was corrupted, the cost of corruption, the revenue of the resource mine etc will sys- tematically influence the mine crisis, the paper offers some policy advices basing on these analysis.

关 键 词：矿难 最优贿赂 腐败 监管 矿难治理 

分 类 号：F121[经济管理—世界经济]