基于双向拍卖模型的农地流转交易研究  

A Study on the Circulation of Farmlands Based on Double Auction Model

作　　者：钟林[1,2] 唐小我[1] 倪得兵[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054 [2]四川建筑职业技术学院经济管理系,四川德阳618000

出　　处：《预测》2010年第2期47-52,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70702025);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20060614023)

摘　　要：在农地流转市场中,拥有农地承包经营权的农户是卖方,对农地有需求的组织或个人是买方,政府或中介服务机构可视作拍卖商。为模型化这种经济定价机制,建立了一个双向拍卖模型,首先买卖双方分别报价,然后拍卖商根据双方报价确定成交价格,最后在这一价格下完成交易。模型的均衡分析表明,双向拍卖机制能够实现事后帕累托效率改进。进一步,比较静态分析表明,需求、供给和制度因素对农地流转交易成功的概率有影响,因此,政府可以通过选择适当的对农户利益关心程度来最大化农地流转交易成功的概率。In the rural lands circulation market, farmers can be viewed as sellers of the use right of farmlands while other individuals （organizations） who hope to make use of that right as buyers and the government as auctioneer. To model this setting, we build a double-auction model where the seller and the buyer bid their prices independently, then auctioneer determines the final price according to their bids, and finally they transfer the use right of the corresponding farmland at the final price determined by the government. The equilibrium shows that a double-auction mechanism can a- chieve an ex post Pareto improvement. Further, the comparative statics explores how the demand-side, supply-side and institutional factors influence the probability of transferring the use right in the circulation of farmlands, and then points out that the government can maximize that probability by placing an appropriate weight on farmers＇ well-being.

关 键 词：双向拍卖 农地流转 贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]