后股权分置改革上市公司经理层股权激励的决定因素研究  

The Determinants of Management Equity Incentive in Listed Chinese Companies after the Reform of Dividing Stock

作　　者：冯涛[1] 杨瑾[1,2] 刘湘勤[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061 [2]中国人民银行西安分行,陕西西安710075

出　　处：《统计与信息论坛》2010年第3期40-45,共6页Journal of Statistics and Information

摘　　要：基于股权分置改革后2005-2008年713家上市公司连续4年的数据,采用面板数据二值响应模型,实证考察了上市公司推行经理层股权激励安排的决定因素,结果表明:所有权和经营权分离程度越高的企业,实行经理层股权激励的可能性越大;国有企业比之民营企业更有可能实行经理层股权激励;独立董事占比较高的企业实行经理层股权激励的可能性越大;公司规模越大,越有可能实行经理层股权激励;成长性越高的企业,实行经理层股权激励的可能性越大。Based on panel data of 713 companies from 2005 to 2008 after the reform of dividing stock, the paper investigates empirically the determinants of management equity incentive in chinese listed companies. The conclusions are as follow： the more the separation of ownership and operation, the higher proportion of independent directors, the bigger the scale , the higher rate of growth opportunity, the higher of possibility a company executes the arrangement of management equity incentive. Additional, state - owned listed companies are more preferable to adopt management equity incentive than non state- owned enterprises.

关 键 词：后股权分置改革 经理层股权激励 二值响应模型 

分 类 号：C931.2[经济管理—管理学]