实施反倾销税与政府补贴的国内总福利比较  

Comparing government subsidy with anti-dumping tax using domestic social welfare

作　　者：武睿思[1] 钟根元[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200230

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第1期111-113,共3页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce：Natural Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70673061)

摘　　要：通过建立模型,研究了国内政府对国外产品征收反倾销税与对国内产品实施政府补贴两种情况下,国内社会总福利的不同.模型的基本思想是国内企业与国外企业在国内市场上同时博弈,达到古诺产量均衡,国内政府追求最大化的国内社会总福利.结果显示,在对国内企业实施政府补贴的情况下,能得到更高的国内社会总福利,同时国内的消费者获得更多的消费者剩余,国内企业也获得了更多的利润;与之相对应,政府的财政收入有一定程度的下降.因此,面对国外产品的倾销,政府更应该采用对国内企业实施政府补贴而非对国外企业征收反倾销税.这个结论对国内政府应对国外产品进口采取何种措施具有一定的理论指导意义.This paper studies the difference of domestic social welfare between when government imposes foreign products anti-dumping taxes and when government offers domestic companies subsidy.The model used in this article assumed a foreign company and a domestic company play a simultaneous game in domestic market,and end up in Cournot equilibrium,then calculates the domestic social welfare.The result showed when government offers domestic company subsidy,the domestic social welfare is higher,at the same time,domestic consumers and company also gained higher welfare,but at the cost of government＇s revenue.And concludes that facing foreign dumping,government should offer domestic companies welfare instead of imposing anti-dumping taxes,which is important to government＇s decision making process about foreign products dumping.

关 键 词：同时博弈 古诺均衡 反倾销税 政府补贴 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]