不完全信息下反倾销与补贴的动态博弈研究  

Difference research between AD rates and subsidy of dynamic game under incomplete information

作　　者：刘碧颖[1] 奚俊芳[1] 钟根元[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第1期114-118,共5页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce：Natural Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70673061)

摘　　要：通过构建由一个市场和两个国家组成的不完全信息动态博弈模型,运用经济学原理和博弈论方法,得到国内产品市场的Stackel-berg均衡;同时根据博弈分析结果,得出存在倾销的情况下国内政府部门如何确定反倾销税率以及对国内企业实行补贴,以使国内社会福利最大化.By means of analyzing gamely Stackel-berg equilibrium of anti-dumping and subsidy among enterprises in a foreign countries enterprise and a domestic enterprise,assuming business enterprises and government are under dynamic game of incomplete information,this paper gets the Stackel-berg equilibrium in the domestic market,and conclude that domestic government how to determine the anti-dumping duty rate and subsidy to maximize the domestic welfare which is compared with that is without subsidy;it can also be concluded that the domestic government should subsidy the domestic enterprise and provided the domestic government with theoretical basis for their future best anti-dumping strategies.

关 键 词：不完全信息 反倾销 补贴 Stackel-berg均衡 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]