基于投资者风险偏好和期权博弈理论的发电投资决策模型  

A modeling of generation investment decision-making based on different risk preference and option-game theory

作　　者：黄文杰[1] 黄奕[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学工商管理学院,北京102206

出　　处：《华北电力大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第2期99-103,共5页Journal of North China Electric Power University：Natural Science Edition

摘　　要：项目前期的投资决策阶段是整个项目管理工作的关键环节。中国的电力工业市场化改革使发电企业的投资决策面临更多的不确定因素和风险。而且,其他投资者的投资行为和投资者本身的风险偏好都会对投资决策产生影响。基于行为经济学视角,研究投资者不同的风险偏好,并以此为基础对期权博弈理论中折现率固定不变的缺陷进行修正,构造了一种基于投资者不同风险偏好的发电期权博弈投资决策模型。The investment decision- making process is the key phase in the early moment of the project. The generation company will face more and more uncertain factors and risks during the Chinese deregulated power market. Moreover, the investment behavior of other investor and the different risk preference of the investor themselves would af- feet the investment decision - making. Based on behavioral economics view, study on the different risk preference of the investor, modify the limitation of the changeless discounting rate in the option- game theory, and a model of generation investment decision- making based on different risk preference and option- game theory was constructed.

关 键 词：发电投资 决策 有限理性 期权博弈 风险偏好 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F123.9[经济管理—世界经济]