基于精炼贝叶斯均衡的制造网格资源交易  

Resource Trade in Manufacturing Grid Based on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

作　　者：张海军[1,2] 胡业发[1,2] 周祖德[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学机电工程学院,湖北武汉430070 [2]武汉理工大学湖北省数字制造重点实验室,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《华南理工大学学报（自然科学版）》2010年第2期78-84,共7页Journal of South China University of Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金国际合作项目(50620130441)

摘　　要：在制造网格资源市场中,一些资源服务提供者(RSPs)利用其拥有的信息优势制造混同均衡,使得资源服务需求者(RSDs)在信息不完美情况下无法辨别资源质量的高低.为此,文中提出了基于精炼贝叶斯均衡的制造网格资源交易,在制造网格系统架构的支持下,RSPs通过承诺赔偿价格作为信息传递手段,使RSPs达到分离均衡的目的,从而防止低质量产品的RSPs模仿高质量产品而向RSDs发送错误信号.仿真结果显示,此博弈模型有一个稳定、合理、RSPs不会主动偏离的精炼贝叶斯分离均衡.In the manufacturing grid （MGrid） resource market, some resource service providers （RSPs） with resource information superiority tend to make a pooling equilibrium. Therefore, resource service demanders （RSDs） cannot evaluate resource quality owing to the imperfect information. In order to solve this problem, this paper proposes a resource trading approach of manufacturing grid based on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In this approach, with the support of MGrid system architecture, RSPs promise a compensation for the display of resource quality, thus achieving in separating equilibrium and preventing low-quality RSPs from sending out a higher compensation that high-quality RSPs would promise. Simulated results show that the proposed game model achieves a stable, reasonable and perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium, from which RSPs would not deviate initiatively.

关 键 词：制造网格 信号博弈论 精炼贝叶斯均衡 资源交易 分离均衡 

分 类 号：TP393.02[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]