定向增发新股、资产注入类型与上市公司绩效的关系--来自中国证券市场的经验证据  

The Private Placements of Equity (PPE),Types of Asset-Injecting and Performance of the Listed Companies——the evidence from the China's Security Market

作　　者：章卫东[1,2] 李海川[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计发展研究中心 [2]江西财经大学会计学院,330013

出　　处：《会计研究》2010年第3期58-64,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：江西财经大学会计学院章卫东教授国家社会科学基金项目“定向增发、资产收购与利益输送问题研究”(项目号:09BJY017);教育部人文社会科学研究项目“中国上市公司股权再融资问题研究”(项目号:07JA630064)研究的阶段性成果;“江西财经大学资本市场与行为金融理论国际学术创新团队”支持项目的资助

摘　　要：股权分置改革之后,通过定向增发新股实现控股股东向上市公司注入资产成为中国证券市场的"热点"问题。本文对2006-2007年间不同类型定向增发资产注入的短期宣告效应和长期持有超额收益率进行比较研究发现,其短期累积超额收益率无显著差异,但投资者获得的长期持有超额收益率与资产注入类型显著相关。当注入的资产与上市公司的业务相关时,投资者获得的长期持有超额收益率显著高于注入的资产与上市公司的业务不相关的长期持有超额收益率,因此,可能存在控股股东向上市公司注入劣质资产进行利益输送的现象。本文用大股东与小股东的代理理论解释了上述现象。After the reform of split share structure,it is a hot topic that the controlling shareholders inject assets into listed companies by the Private Placements of Equity(PPE)in the China's capital market.The paper analyzes the short-term announcement effect and long-term buy-hold abnormal return(BHAR)of different types of Assets-Injecting by PPE in the period of 2006-2007 and finds that,there is no significant difference between short-term cumulative abnormal returns,but there is significant difference between BHARs.When the type is related,the BHAR is higher and the difference is significant statistically.Hence,the controlling shareholders may inject poor-quality assets into listed companies by PPE to tunnel the listed companies.The paper explains the above phenomenon using the agency theory between the majority shareholders and minority shareholders.

关 键 词：定向增发新股 资产注入类型 利益输送 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F272F832.51