公允价值会计政策选择的进化博弈分析  

Analysis on the fair value accounting choice by evolutionary game theory

作　　者：刘斌[1] 熊运莲[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《科研管理》2010年第2期147-153,共7页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472017)

摘　　要：2006年2月,财政部颁布了以公允价值应用为主要特征的新会计准则。然而在开始执行的2007年,119家房地产上市公司中仅有2家采用公允价值计量模式,其余均采用历史成本计量模式。这种现象是房地产上市公司的理性选择还是趋同?本文以理性和有限理性为线索,分别利用规范分析和进化博弈的复制动态方法,对此现象进行了理论分析。分析结果表明,我国房地产上市公司的会计政策选择并不是完全理性的,存在着明显的趋同效应。In February,2006,Chinese Ministry of Finance issues a new accounting standard,Enterprise Accounting Principle No.3-investing real estate. In 2007,only two real estate listed companies introduced the fair value accounting,but 117 real estate listed companies adopted the historical cost accounting. Is this phenomenon a rational choice or tendency toward convergence for the real estate listed companies？ Based on the clues to the rationality and bounded rationality,this phenomenon is analyzed by the canonical analysis and evolutionary game theory. The result shows that the accounting choices for Chinese real estate listed companies are bounded rationality,and there is a remarkable tendency toward convergence.

关 键 词：公允价值 理性 有限理性 进化博弈 

分 类 号：F230.9[经济管理—会计学]