上市公司再融资监管政策博弈分析  

Game Analysis about SEO Regulatory Policies of Listed Companies

作　　者：毕金玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院,大连116023

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第2期37-40,共4页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：2009年度辽宁省哲学社会科学规划基金项目(L09BJY010)

摘　　要：再融资监管政策成为中国上市公司再融资决策的重要影响因素。文章以增发政策为例应用博弈论缺口模型分析再融资监管政策对上市公司再融资决策的影响,研究表明增发政策产生增发资格线,而监管政策的限制,理论上产生预期收入的巨大缺口,当上市公司达不到增发资格线时即产生操纵业绩的动机。针对存在的问题提出以净资产收益率作为再融资资格衡量指标的同时,可以考虑考核附加财务指标,同时为保证高质量的信息披露应加强审计监管。The SEO regulatory policies are an important factor influencing the SEO decision-making of listed companies in China. The paper analyzes SEO regulatory policies with the gap model of game theory, and finds that the policies of addissuance will bring issuance of additional qualification line, while the regulatory policy limits theoretically produce the huge gap of expected income, and when the companies fail to qualify additional lines, they will have the motivation to manipulate performance. The paper argues that regulatory department can use ROE as assessment indicator to qualify listed companies, while considering additional assessment of financial indicators; at the same time audit supervision should be strengthened in order to ensure the high quality of information disclosure.

关 键 词：再融资 监管政策 预期收入 缺口模型 混同均衡 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]