CDM与配额交易机制投资激励效果比较研究  

Comparison Research of Investment Incentive Effects Between CDM and Quota-trading Mechanism

作　　者：曾鸣[1] 何深[1] 杨玲玲[1] 田廓[1] 董军[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学能源与电力经济研究咨询中心,北京102206

出　　处：《华东电力》2010年第3期322-325,共4页East China Electric Power

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70671041;70771039);教育部博士点基金项目(200800790007)

摘　　要：继碳排放交易展望之后,对清洁发展机制(CDM)与配额交易机制的引入进行了比较。采用两阶段博弈分步研究企业的产出决策及投资决策,以效益模型为手段,详细比较了不完全竞争市场下两种碳排放交易机制对低碳电力技术投资的激励效果,并在结论部分简要阐述了完全竞争市场下相应的效果分析。结果表明,完全竞争市场中CDM机制下的投资收益将不低于限额与交易机制;而不完全竞争市场中CDM机制下的投资可能会面临一种战略失误,使得CDM机制下的投资收益低于限额与交易机制。研究为我国电力市场碳排放交易机制的设计提供了有益的参考。Following the prospects of carbon emissions trading,the introduction of CDM and quota-trading mechanism was compared.A two-stage game was used to investigate enterprises′ output decisions and investment decisions step by step.During this process,the incentive effects of the two kinds of carbon emissions trading mechanisms for low-carbon electricity technology investments were compared in detail with benefit models in oligopoly market.In the conclusion,the corresponding effectiveness analysis was also described briefly in perfect market.The results suggested that the return of investment under the CDM mechanism will not be less than that under the quota and trading mechanism in perfect market.However,the investment under the CDM mechanism may be faced with a strategic mistake in oligopoly market,which leads a lower return on investment under the CDM mechanism than the quota and trading mechanism.All in all,a useful reference was provided for the design of carbon emissions trading mechanism in China′s electricity market.

关 键 词：碳排放交易 CDM 配额交易机制 低碳技术 投资激励 

分 类 号：TM-9[电气工程] F407.61[经济管理—产业经济]