医疗商业贿赂的博弈新论及其治理对策——结合新医改方案的思考  被引量:10

New Game Analysis and Governance Countermeasures on Medical Commercial Bribery——Thinking of the New Medical Reformation Program

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作  者:彭迪云[1,2] 郑克强[1] 许涵[1,3] 姚群[2] 

机构地区:[1]南昌大学教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地中国中部经济发展研究中心,江西南昌330047 [2]南昌大学经济与管理学院 [3]南昌大学理学院,江西南昌330031

出  处:《南昌大学学报(人文社会科学版)》2010年第2期61-67,共7页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基  金:2008年度国家社会科学基金项目"中部地区产业结构服务化拐点预测与政策准备"(08BJL039)

摘  要:医疗商业贿赂破坏了市场竞争规则,损害了患者利益,冲击了国家医药卫生体制改革和医疗保障体系,滋生了腐败和经济犯罪。医疗商业贿赂博弈模型及其改进分析表明,"高薪养廉"不一定有效。实施商业贿赂与受贿者的收益无关,因而盯住在职收入低的部门主管和其"东窗事发"后转换工作带来的净收益都是错误的,限制受贿者的从业资格也是无效的。商业贿赂发生的概率与监管成本正相关,与监管收益负相关。必须结合当前深化医药卫生体制改革的要求,实施"制度反贿",即合理配置权力结构;创新监督管理模式;规范医药产品的采购和使用制度;完善反商业贿赂立法;健全医药企业和医疗机构内部管理制度与自律机制;完善公立医院和注册医师的补偿政策;重视发挥教育和道德的净化和制约作用。Medical commercial bribery undermines the rules of market competition,damages the patients' interests,imposes great impact on the reform of national medical and health system and medical security system and propagates corruption and economic crime.Medical commercial bribery game model and its advanced analysis indicates that "honesty with high salary" is not always efficient.Implementing medical commercial bribery is irrelevant to bribee's profit.So it is incorrect to focus on the department managers with less post earning and net income from changing jobs after scandals are exposed,so as to confine bribees' career qualification.The sufficiency the commercial bribery happens is positvely correlated to supervision costs and negatively to supervision benefit.Deepening the medical sanitary system reform,it is necessary to rely on "system of anti-corruption",disposing power structure reasonably,inovating managing and supervising pattern,regulating the medical products' system of purchasing and application,improving legislation on anti-commercial bribery,perfecting internal management institution and self-discipline mechanism of medical corperation and organization,enhancing compensating policy to public hospital and certified doctors,emphasizing education and moral restiction.

关 键 词:医疗商业贿赂 寻租 博弈论 医药卫生体制 制度反贿 

分 类 号:F721[经济管理—产业经济] R197.322[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]

 

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