制度视角下发展中国家小额贷款运营机制研究——以格莱珉银行为例  

Analysis On Microlending Of Developing Coutries Based On Neo-Institutional Economics

作　　者：唐柳洁[1,2] 崔娟[3] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学经济学院,北京100081 [2]云南财经大学财政与经济学院,昆明650221 [3]中南财经政法大学新华金融保险学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《经济问题》2010年第4期118-121,共4页On Economic Problems

基　　金：中央财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目(08-Y-013);云南财经大学科研基金资助项目(YC09B010)

摘　　要：传统的信贷配给模型论证了信贷抵押能有效解决道德风险,其结果是将无资产可抵押的穷人排除在金融体系之外。格莱珉银行的无抵押小额贷款通过客户筛选机制、动态激励机制和内在约束机制的设计、剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对称、正规制度与非正规制度的最大兼容,确保穷人98%的还款率。这给"抵押难"、"担保难"的中国农村金融提供了借鉴,揭示了穷人诚信的根源在于制度创新。The traditional credit rationing models demonstrate that mortgages can resolve moral hazard effectively.The theory made the poor who have no mortgages out of the financial system.The Grameen Bank offers no mortgages microlending to the poor.Their institutional designs including dynamic incentive and binding mechanism,residual claim and authority as an organic unity,regular and irregular institutions compatibility,guarantee the poor always pay back.The success of Grameen bank shows the root of the poor＇s credit lies on the institutional innovation.Their experience can be used as a reference for China rural finance.

关 键 词：格莱珉银行 无抵押小额贷款 穷人诚信 制度 

分 类 号：F112.1[经济管理—国际贸易]