第三方负责回收再制造闭环供应链契约设计  

Contract Design on Closed-loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing Based on Third-party Collecting

作　　者：陈菊红[1] 史成东[1,2] 郭福利[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学工商管理学院,陕西西安710048 [2]山东理工大学电气与电子工程学院,山东淄博255091

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2010年第2期17-21,共5页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70602017);山东省软科学研究计划项目(2009RKA173)

摘　　要：以博弈论为基本研究方法,考查了制造商、销售商和第三方物流服务商构成的Stackelberg再制造闭环供应链中,节点企业为了取得最优利润,如何确定产品的批发价、销售价,废旧产品的回收价和回收转移价等,发现在分散决策(非合作博弈)下系统的利润要低于集中决策(合作博弈)下系统的利润。通过设计收入费用共享契约,增加了产品的销售量和废旧产品的回收量,提高了制造商、销售商、第三方物流服务商的利润和消费者的效用,实现了Stackelberg再制造闭环供应链系统的协调。In this paper,we address how the agents make their price decision including wholesale price,retail price,collection price and return transfer price in the Stackelberg closed-loop supply chain（SCLSC） with product remanufacturing composed of manufacturer,retailer and third-party logistics provider based on game theory.It＇s indicated that the system profit in the decentralized SCLSC is less than in the centralized SCLSC.Therefore,a revenue-and-expense sharing contract is presented to coordinate the SCLSC.The result shows revenue-and-expense sharing contract can increase product sale quantity and used product recovery quantity,enhance SCLSC profit and customer utility.

关 键 词：博弈论 Stackelberg闭环供应链 供应链协调 收益费用共享契约 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]