不完全契约下的劳动剩余控制权安排研究  

A Research on Implicit Contracts and Labor Residual Controlling Arrangement

作　　者：郑文智[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《湖北经济学院学报》2010年第2期105-109,共5页Journal of Hubei University of Economics

基　　金：福建省自然科学基金项目(D0740012);福建省软科学资助项目(2007R0047)

摘　　要：员工与雇主之间的劳动关系具有平等与隶属的双重性,劳动争议的发生本质上是"平等"与"隶属"的争议,表现为劳动过程中对劳动剩余控制权的谈判与争夺。在不完全契约条件下,对剩余控制权分配的机制安排取决于劳资双方的谈判实力,应当设计有利于提升劳动者相对谈判实力的机制来实现社会和谐与经济的可持续发展。There is an equality and subordinate doubleness of labor relation between employee and employer. The absence of labor dispute is bargaining about equality and subordinate. Under implicit contract condition, the mechanism arrangement of distribution labor residual controlling is depend on the bargaining situation of both sides. In order to realize social harmony and sustainable development, we should design some mechanism to promote labor bargaining strength.

关 键 词：不完全契约 劳动剩余控制权 讨价还价 制度安排 

分 类 号：D912.5[政治法律—民商法学]