高级管理人员变更、股权特征与盈余管理--来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Top Management Turnovers,Ownership Structure and Earnings Management

作　　者：朱星文[1] 廖义刚[2] 谢盛纹[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学 [2]江西财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2010年第2期23-29,共7页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：江西财经大学“公司治理与会计治理”创新团队项目资助

摘　　要：本文以2003-2006年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,检验公司发生高级管理人员变更时的盈余管理行为。研究结果表明,发生高级管理层变更的公司,高级管理人员变更的当年存在较严重的调减利润的盈余管理行为;此外,对于发生了高级管理人员变更的公司,如果其控股股东是地方和中央政府部门所属国企或中央直属国企,则其调减利润的盈余管理行为可以得到一定程度的抑制;大股东的制衡度越大,公司盈余管理的幅度也将越小。研究结果还显示,当发生高级管理人员变更时,上述因素对公司调增利润的盈余管理行为基本没有影响。The relations between the change of top manager and earnings management has always been a hot concern in earnings management field. This paper adopts data of China s A-share listed companies through 2003-2006 to empirically test the effects of top manager change on earnings management. This paper＇s main text contains four hypotheses： （1） Ceteris paribus, the companies whose top manager have changed would be inclined to adopt the earnings management of cutting profit in that year. （2） Ceteris paribus, when the largest shareholders of the companies whose top manager have changed belong to the first kind, the probability of earnings management in that year would be lower. （3） Ceteris paribus, for the companies whose top manager have changed, there is a positive relationship between the largest shareholder of the companies and the probability of earnings management in that year. （4） Ceteris paribus, for the companies whose top manager have changed, there is a negative relationship between the monitor of the second or third shareholders on the largest shareholder and the probability of earnings management in that year. The conclusions of this paper are： （1） For the sample whose DA are below 0, there would be a larger probability of earnings management to cutting profit if the companies whose top manager have changed in that year. But if the largest shareholder are state-owned enterprises which belong to the local or the central government： the probability of earnings management would be lower. And, there is a negative relationship between the monitor of the second or third shareholders on the largest shareholder and the probability of earnings management. （2） The regression result of the sample groups whose DA are above 0 shows that there is little difference with the earnings management range between the companies whose top manager have changed and the companies whose top manager have not changed. However, if the largest shareholder of the companies whose top manager have changed is st

关 键 词：高级管理层变更 股权特征 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F272