基于矿业监管博弈的激励约束机制研究  

A Study on Incentive and Restraint Mechanism based on Mining Supervision Game

作　　者：刘香玲[1] 魏晓平[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221008

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2010年第3期8-11,共4页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目:能源资源最优开采顺序研究(批准号:90610032)

摘　　要：资源型城市地方政府在执行矿业监管权时,通常由于信息不对称及矿业政策执行力度范围限定与中央政府博弈。基于由此导致的矿业生产外部性,通过分析中央政府与地方政府各自的目标偏好和效益函数,利用经济博弈论和矩阵对策,试图寻求矿业监管存在问题的原因。文章尝试在利用行为经济学"前景理论"建模的基础上,借助贝叶斯理论分析,提出贝叶斯风险成本诱导机制,进而得出在该机制的激励约束下矿业监管倾向于帕累托有效。文章最后结合研究结论给出政策建议,为制定我国的能源资源开采政策提供了重要的理论参考。When local government in resource-based city implements mining regulations of supervision as a deputy of the central government during Economy in Transition, adverse speculations often occur as a result of asymmetric information and the limited extent of mining policy enforcement. Based on the resulting negative externalities, this paper tried to find reasons for the problem of mining supervision by the use of the methods of game theory and matrix countermeasure through the respective analysis of objective preferences and efficiency functions of central government and local government. Then the paper built a model based on ＂prospect theory＂ of Behavioral Economics and developed an induced mechanism of Bayesian risk-cost by the modeling analysis, and concluded that Mining supervision tended to be Pareto Efficiency under this mechanisms＇ Incentive and restrictive force. The paper last gives policy proposals, which will play a theoretical reference function in formulating energy resources exploitation policies.

关 键 词：矿业监管 诱导机制 博弈场 投机行为 风险成本 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学] F206