中央集权体制下地方权力的运行策略——从“驻京办”透视地方法制  

The Operation Strategy of Local Power under the Centralized System:a reflection on Local Rule from Beijing Office

作　　者：李旭东[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学法学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《广东广播电视大学学报》2010年第2期12-17,共6页Journal of Guangdong Radio & Television University

基　　金：教育部重大课题攻关项目<我国地方法制建设理论与实践研究>的部分研究成果;项目编号:08JZD0010

摘　　要："驻京办"现象反映了当代中国地方法制的若干特点。地方权力在运行过程中体现出如下特点:地位的从属性、地方利益的弹性、对中央政策的取舍性、地方单位对中央的博奕性。驻京办现象体现出当前中国地方法制的现实制度架构,即在中央集权体制之下,地方通过自己的权力运行策略形成了以"驻京办"等实践方式为特点的地方分权的非正式机制。目前的央地关系体制中对地方权力缺乏正式有效的制度安排。The phenomenon of Beijing Office represents the basic features of local rule. The local power has presented its characteristics in operation, such as, its subordinate status, elasticity of its interest, selectivity and game to the central authority We can summarize a general structure of local system from inspecting the Beijing Office, that is, local power has formed an informal system of decentralization under the centralized system through Beijing Office, however the local power is still short of their formal and legal status when they pursuit their interest under the centralized system

关 键 词：驻京办 中央集权 地方法制 策略 

分 类 号：D927[政治法律—法学]