风险企业中的控制权与可转换证券研究  

Convertible securities and control rights in ventures firm

作　　者：王声凑[1] 曾勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2010年第2期209-215,276,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(200806140016);高校博士点基金资助项目(20080614006);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-0897)

摘　　要：从不完全合约的理论框架出发,讨论了风险企业清算权、替换权与可转换证券的配置问题.由于企业家私人利益的存在,风险投资家和企业家在清算权、替换权上存在着利益冲突.首先分析风险企业以债券作为融资工具时,替换权的单边配置不能使企业决策达到最优;其次探讨风险企业以普通股作为融资工具的局限性;最后证明了可转换证券与清算权、替换权的合理配置能解决风险投资家和企业家的利益冲突,并且解释了风险企业经常出现的现金流权和控制权不一致的现象.This paper applies the framework of incomplete contracts analyzing the allocation of liquidation rights, replacement rights and convertible securities in ventures finn. The conflicts on liquidation rights and replacement rights between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs exist because entrepreneurs have private benefits. This paper first analyzes that the unilateral control of replacement rights can not achieve optimal decisions when venture finns use bonds as a financing tool. Second, this paper investigates the limitations of common stocks as a financing tool for venture firms. Finally, this paper shows that the conflicts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs can be resolved through the combination of convertible securities and liquidation rights and replacement rights, and indicates why controls rights are disproportionate with cash flow rights in a venture firm.

关 键 词：控制权 现金流权 可转换证券 不完全合约 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]