基于跨期投资视角的控股股东两期控制权私利行为  

Controlling shareholder's double-temporal private benefits under intertemporal investment

作　　者：豆中强[1] 刘星[1] 陈其安[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2010年第4期628-636,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70772100,70771118);教育部博士点基金(教技发中心函[2006]226号)

摘　　要：以控制权收益理论为基础,构建跨期投资下的控股股东两期利益侵占模型,研究现金流权比例、远期投资收益率和股东法律保护力度对控制权私利的影响.结果表明:现金流权比例、股东法律保护力度与控股股东的即期和远期最优侵占水平均负相关;远期投资收益率与控股股东的即期最优侵占水平负相关,但与远期最优侵占水平无关;控股股东在两期侵占中的即期最优侵占水平低于其单期侵占中的即期最优侵占水平,远期最优侵占水平则保持不变;控股股东非短视,其终极目标是实现控制权私利的长期收益最大化,而获取控制权长期收益最大化也是导致其两期侵占行为发生的主要原因.Based on the theory of private benefits of control,this paper builds double-temporal expropriation models under intertemporal investments to analyze how cash-flow rights,future rate of return and legal protection affect private benefits of controlling shareholder.The conclusions show that：cash-flow rights and legal protection of shareholders are negative with the current and future first-best expropriation; the future rate of return is negative with the current first-best expropriation,but irrelative with the future first-best expropriation level;the current first-best expropriation in double-temporal is lower than that in single expropriation,the future first-best expropriation keeps stable;so controlling shareholder is not short-sighted,his aim is to maximize the ultimate private benefits of control.

关 键 词：控股股东 跨期投资 两期侵占 最优侵占水平 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学]