从经济学视角看电力监管合谋  

Analysis on the Collusion Behavior in the Power Regulatory Based on the View Point of Economics

作　　者：任玉珑[1] 杨菲菲[1] 周滢露[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《能源技术经济》2010年第4期39-42,共4页Electric Power Technologic Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(90510016)

摘　　要：从经济学的视角,运用委托-代理理论、扩展的"经济人"假设以及信息不对称理论对电力监管合谋行为及其成因进行了系统描述。论证表明,电力监管合谋有可能存在于电力行业的发电、输配电以及市场交易各环节,监管者作为扩展意义上的"经济人",有可能与企业形成合谋联盟;而信息不对称的存在则为合谋这种违规行为创造了实现的机会。Based on the view point of economics and according to the principal-agent theory, the expanded ＂economic man＂assumption, as well as the asymmetric information theory, the collusion behavior and its genesis in power regulatory are described. It is demonstrated that the collusion behavior may exist in various links of the power sector such as generation, transmission and distribution, as well as transaction. The regulators, as an expanded ＂economic man＂, might form a collusive alliance with the enterprises and the existence of asymmetric information provides opportunities for this collusion behavior.

关 键 词：电力监管 市场化改革 电力市场 合谋 经济学 

分 类 号：F123.16[经济管理—世界经济]