我国地方政府失信形成机理与惩罚机制研究  

The Credit Shortage Formation and Discipline Mechanism of Local Government in China

作　　者：范柏乃[1] 龙海波[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310027

出　　处：《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2010年第3期164-173,共10页Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573093)

摘　　要：地方政府失信已成为建设社会信用体系的一个最大障碍。通过对失信形成机理框架和耗散结构理论的分析发现:经济人自利是失信形成的意识诱因;行为主体的强势直接导致了失信形成;公共信息不对称是造成失信的信息鸿沟;信用文化缺失促使行政价值的偏离;监督机制不足导致行政权力的泛滥。当政府系统总熵达到某阈值时,系统会向低级平衡系统转移,使地方政府走向最终平衡状态,形成地方政府的失信。在此基础上,可从管理协同的视角构建以信息公开、失信测评、责任追究、危害补救、守信激励、申诉复核六大子系统为主的地方政府失信惩罚机制。The credit shortage of local government has become the biggest obstacle in the construction of a social credit system. In order to effectively punish the credit shortage of local government, it is necessary to investigate its formation mechanism. By applying the framework of credit shortage formation mechanism and the theory of dissipative structure, this paper analyzes the causes of credit shortage. The results of this analysis reveal that personal economic interests are the incentive of credit shortage formation and strong subject is its direct impetus. Public information asymmetry forms information gap, contributing to credit shortage. The lack of a credit culture leads to the deviation of administration value, and weak supervision leads to executive power abuse. When the total entropy of government reaches a certain threshold, the system will shift to a low-balance one, resulting in loss of trust in the government. Based on the study, this paper outlines a credit shortage discipline system from the perspective of management synergy,which involves opening information to the public, evaluating the degree of credit shortage, investigating accountability, remedying faults, encouraging credit adherence and reviewing complaint.

关 键 词：地方政府 失信形成机理 惩罚机制 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]