基于销售定额的信息甄别模型和差别工资  

Screening Model and Wage Discrimination based on Sale Quota

作　　者：邱巍[1] 李富田[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南科技大学经济管理学院,四川绵阳621010

出　　处：《科技创业月刊》2010年第5期100-101,共2页Journal of Entrepreneurship in Science & Technology

摘　　要：根据不同能力类型的销售人员具有不同形状的效用曲线这一假设,建立了信息甄别模型来研究销售人员的报酬激励机制,证明了分离均衡是该模型唯一的均衡,并且优于混同均衡,得出以差别工资制取代统一工资制可以提高管理效率,减少了雇佣双方由于信息不对称带来的无谓损失,其结果具有一定的理论和实际意义。According to the different abilities of different types of sales personnel with the assumption that the shape of utility curves, established screening model to study the sale of a reward incentive mechanism, proved the only separating e- quilibrium is the equilibrium of the model, and better than the. pooling equilibrium, come to replace the unified wage differ- ential wage system can improve management efficiency, reduce employers and employees as deadweight loss caused by asym- metric information, the result has some theoretical and practical significance.

关 键 词：销售定额 信息甄别 差别工资 

分 类 号：F240[经济管理—劳动经济]