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机构地区:[1]中国海洋大学经济学院 [2]中国海洋大学国际经济与贸易系
出 处:《中国渔业经济》2010年第1期150-154,共5页Chinese Fisheries Economics
摘 要:随着环境友好型社会以及可持续发展观的不断深入,自营组织走绿色营销之路已经成为了必然趋势。本文以水产企业为例,从三个方面对自营组织实施绿色营销战略的"困境"进行了博弈分析:无政府干预情况下企业实施绿色营销的"囚徒困境",有政府干预的情况下企业实施绿色营销的博弈分析,生产绿色产品的企业与生产虚假绿色产品的企业之间的"智猪博弈"。博弈分析的结果表明,政府必须在各行业实施绿色营销的过程中发挥重要作用,加大对污染产品的惩罚力度,减少和降低非绿色产品销售量及市场占有率,成立绿色产品开发基金和绿色产品技改基金,并且给予绿色企业适当补贴,这才是解决自营组织"困境"的有效措施。With the construction of environmental friendship society and sustainable development, self-support enterprises have transferred to green products marketing enterprises. Authors have taken an aquatic product enterprise as an example, and made game analysis in three aspects: the "Prisoner's Dilemma" of implementation of green marketing under free governmental interference; implementation of green marketing under governmental interference; "Pigs' Payoffs" between the real produce green aquatic product enterprises and the fake green aquatic products enterprises. From the three game analysis, the authors have pointed out that the government must play an important role in green marketing, and establish green aquatic product fund and give some subsidy to green aquatic product enterprises in order to solve the difficulties of self-support enterprises.
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