大股东寻租利益驱动及法律监督机制研究——基于我国上市公司股权再融资偏好的分析  

Research on Substantial Shareholder's Rent-seeking and Legal Oversight Mechanisms:Analysis Bases on Equity Refinancing Preference of Listed Company in China

作　　者：夏徐斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第3期9-14,86,共7页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：西方"优序融资理论"在发达国家资本市场早已被普遍证实,却在中国遭遇"悖论",我国上市公司存在强烈的股权再融资偏好。我国上市公司偏好股权再融资,带来的突出问题就是资本使用效率不高。对于造成这种偏好的原因,学术界争论颇多。股权再融资过程中,大股东存在强烈的利益驱动,可以利用其控制权进行寻租。这是造成我国上市公司强烈股权再融资偏好的重要原因,需要法律监督来对此进行有效的抑制。＂Pecking order theory＂ has been widely confirmed in capital market of developed country,while encounters ＂paradox＂ in China.There exists strong equity preference of refinancing in Chinese listed company,it causes serious problem of capital inefficiency.To reasons of equity preference,there is quite a lot of academic debate.The substantial shareholder have strong interest-driven to lease by their power of control in the process of refinancing.It is a important reason to strong equity preference of refinancing in Chinese listed company,it needs legal supervision to restrain.

关 键 词：股权再融资偏好 大股东寻租 利益驱动 法律监督机制 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]