基于多任务委托代理模型的腐败行为分析  

An Analysis of Corruption Based on the Multi-task Principal-agent Model

作　　者：陈永成[1] 陈光焱[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学财政税务学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《当代财经》2010年第5期26-31,共6页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：2007年教育部人文社科规划基金项目"清代火耗归公与养廉银制度"(07JA790061)

摘　　要：高薪未必养廉。高薪养廉必须以提高激励收益为前提,从遏制腐败动机和减少腐败机会入手。同时,政府官员的风险态度、工作努力成本变化率和工作的监督性等因素对高薪养廉也有影响。当政府官员代理多项工作或任务时,高薪养廉必须具备门槛条件,而其门槛条件取决于不同工作或任务之间的关系是独立、互补还是替代。对完成互补性工作或任务的官员,高薪养廉将会起到相互促进的作用;反之亦然。如果任务之间相互独立,则实行竞争上岗、自由择岗,高薪养廉意义更大。另外,构建社会诚信体系有助于高薪养廉。Honesty may not be paid. To foster honesty and cleanness by high salary must take the improvement of incentive earnings as a premise and take measures to curb the inducement and reduce the opportunities for corruption. At the same time, such factors as the risk awareness of government officials, change rates of working effort cost, supervision over the work and so on will also have some effects on the policy of fostering honesty and cleanness by high salary. When government officials taking a number of agency work or tasks, the policy of fostering honesty and cleanness by high salary must have a threshold condition, and the threshold condition depends on the relationship between the agency works or tasks： independent, complementary or substitutive. For those who have completed complementary works or tasks, this policy will play a role of promoting each other; and vice versa. If the tasks are independent between each other, the policy of fostering honesty and cleanness by high salary will be more meaningful by means of choosing posts through competition with freedom. In addition, the construction of a social credit system will be a great help to the policy.

关 键 词：腐败行为 高薪养廉 风险态度 工作努力成本 多任务委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]