门槛效应、管制放松与银行效率的改进——理论假说及其来自中国的经验研究  

On the Threshold Effect,Deregulation and the Improvement of Bank Efficiency:Theoretical Hypothesis and Empirical Study from China

作　　者：刘澜飚[1] 王博[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学金融学系,天津300071

出　　处：《金融研究》2010年第3期67-79,共13页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(06&ZD030)"深化财税;金融;外贸和投资体制综合改革";国家社会科学基金一般项目(07BJY160)"全面深化国有商业银行改革";国家自然科学基金项目(70773061)"基于信息熵方法的中国宏观金融风险管理研究"项目资助

摘　　要：允许外资银行进入可能与国内银行市场本身缺乏竞争所引发的整体银行效率不断下降,进而导致限制外资银行进入的成本增加相关。本文参照Montinola等(2001)的理论框架,提出了三个有关外资银行进入的理论命题并运用面板数据包络技术以及Malmquist指数对中国12家主要银行引进国外战略投资者的效果进行经验分析,发现中国国内银行效率的下降确实导致了对外资银行进入管制的放松,但目前外资银行进入对国内银行总体效率影响还不明显,门槛效应可能存在。The liberalization of foreign bank entry may result in a fall of domestic bank efficiency caused by lack of competition, which then lead to the increases of costs to restriction on foreign bank entry. Based on Montinola＇s （ 2001 ） and other models, the paper put forward three hypotheses to explain the foreign bank entry, and apply panel DEA and the Malmquist Index to test the foreign bank entry effect of 12 banks in China by introducing foreign strategy investor. The authors conclude that the fall of domestic bank efficiency lead to the deregulation of foreign bank entry. But so far the effect of liberalization of foreign banks on the efficiency of domestic banks is modest which implied that a threshold effect might exist.

关 键 词：外资银行 银行管制 门槛效应 MALMQUIST指数 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]