控股股东操控动机及行为与财务报告透明度——中国A股市场上市公司的经验证据  

Incentives of Controlling Shareholder,the Behavior of Controlling Shareholder and Financial Reporting Transparency——Data from Chinese A Listed Companies

作　　者：杨忠海[1,2] 周晓苏[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]哈尔滨商业大学会计学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2010年第5期101-109,共9页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"财务报告透明度对投资人保护作用机制研究--以盈余管理为起点"(项目编号:20872053)

摘　　要：以中国A股上市公司2004～2006年的2552个公司年度为样本,以FASB发布的会计信息质量特征为基础,对财务报告透明度进行了实证度量,研究了控股股东动机与行为对上市公司财务报告透明度的影响。研究发现,控股股东的避亏动机、再融资动机和高管更换动机能够显著降低财务报告透明度,而且这三种动机并没有对控股股东行为产生明显的影响;控股股东的扭亏动机显著减少了控股股东的掏空与扶持行为,从而显著提高了财务报告透明度;加强市场监管,能够显著提高财务报告透明度。The authors investigate the impact of the incentives of controlling shareholder and controlling shareholders behavior on financial reporting transparency. Based on a total of 2552 samples obtained from listed firm over the three-year period between 2004 and 2006, the authors comprehensively measure financial reporting transparency. The empirical results indicate that the incentives for avoiding loss, refinancing and or CEO turnover can significantly reduce the transparency of financial reports of listed companies, and these three kinds of incentives have not a significant impact on the behaviors of controlling shareholder. Incentives for turning a profit significantly improves the transparency of financial reports of listed companies through significantly reducing the tunneling and propping by controlling shareholder. The paper also finds that strengthening the supervision of the capital market can significantly enhance the financial reporting transparency.

关 键 词：操控动机 控股股东行为 财务报告透明度 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]