中国铁矿石谈判失利的成因分析——基于供需方博弈视角  

Reasons for China's Defeat in Iron Ore Negotiation:An Analysis Based on the Gaming between Supply Side and Demand Side

作　　者：郑先勇[1] 黄汉民[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《国际经贸探索》2010年第5期43-48,共6页International Economics and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(07BJL042);中南财经政法大学研究生教育创新基金项目(2008BJJ52)

摘　　要：文章用不对称条件下无耐心的讨价还价、囚徒困境和智猪博弈等模型从供需方面分析了近年来中国铁矿石谈判失利的原因,认为中国铁矿石谈判失利的供方原因有:供给能力约束条件下国际铁矿石供应巨头结成了涨价联盟,且具有不对称的谈判信息,故在谈判中拖延成本的相对较小等;需求方的原因有:中国企业在谈判中更多的无耐心,国内钢铁企业之间的利益博弈和国际铁矿石需求各方利益不一致等。进而提出了应对的政策建议。From the two sides of supply and demand, the paper analyzes the reasons of China＇ s defeat in the recent years＇iron ore negotiations by using the gaming models such as Inpatient Bargaining Model on Asymmetrical Conditions, prisoner＇s dilemma and boxed pigs, and finds that the supply-side reasons for the defeat in the negotiations include the price hike union formed by the international iron ore supply giants, the asymmetric information, and the relatively small cost of delay in the negotiations. The demand-side reasons include the lack of patience of Chinese enterprises in the negotiations, the gaming of interests between the domestic steel enterprises, and the inconsistency of interests between the international iron ore demanders. Finally, it puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations.

关 键 词：铁矿石谈判 讨价还价模型 智猪博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]