基于竞争制造商独有零售商的闭环供应链回收渠道的决策分析  

Reverse Channel Decision Analysis for Closed-loop Supply Chain with Manufacturer Competing

作　　者：韩小花[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广州510520

出　　处：《价值工程》2010年第14期8-9,共2页Value Engineering

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金资助(No.09YJC630037);广东工业大学博士基金(No.093036)

摘　　要：主要采用Stackelberg博弈,在竞争制造商独有零售商的市场结构下,研究了闭环供应链回收渠道的决策过程。经过分析论证得出:制造商之间的竞争程度是闭环供应链回收渠道决策的主要影响因素;一般情况下制造商都选择零售商间接回收废旧产品,只有当竞争程度极高时,制造商才都选择不回收废旧产品。To improve the decision efficiency of reverse channel, the reverse channel decision of the closed-loop supply chain was studied based on Stackelberg game under the competing manufactures-common retailer market. Through analysis, a conclusion was the degree of competition between manufactures affects the decision results of reverse channel mainly; manufactures both choose the indirect reverse channel when the degree of competition is low, and beth choose no recovery when the degree is high.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 竞争 独有零售商 回收渠道 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]