基于道德风险的研发外包利益分配方式研究  

Research on Profit Distribution in R&D Outsourcing with Moral Hazard

作　　者：黄波[1] 孟卫东[1] 李宇雨[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2010年第10期16-19,共4页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(08AJY028);教育部高等学校博士学科点基金项目(200806110003);重庆大学研究生创新团队建设项目(200909B0006)

摘　　要：建立了基于道德风险的研发外包博弈模型,研究了发包方如何以利益分配方式作为激励机制来防范承包方的道德风险,分析了发包方和承包方在不同环境和利润分配方式下的投资策略和期望收益,并对混合分配方式进行了改进,找出了不同环境下的最优利益分配方式。In this paper, a game model of R＆D outsourcing with moral hazard is developed, and it is studied that R＆D outsourcer how to use profit distribution as incentive mechanism to prevent moral hazard from R＆D supplier. It analyzes the resource-commitment decisions and the profits of the outsourcer and the supplier under different profit distribution and market environments, improves the mixed distribution model, and finds out the optimum profit distribution for a certain market environment. It is discovered that mixed distribution will lower the possibility of R＆D outsourcing, therefore, the outsourcer should substitute specific assets for cash as advance payment, and the outsourcer should adopt improved mixed distribution in R＆D outsourcing when market return is small, and fixed distribution when market return is large, especially when the proportion of R＆D investment to the total investment is large.

关 键 词：研发外包 道德风险 利益分配方式 

分 类 号：G311[文化科学]