偏向制造商多买方e-供应链的博弈及其影响因素分析  

Study on Game and its Impact Factors about Manufacturer-Oriented E-supply Chain with Multi-Buyers

作　　者：肖剑[1,2] 但斌[1] 张旭梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学数理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2010年第2期111-114,110,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家863计划资助项目(2007AA040801);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-05-0769)

摘　　要：对单个制造商多个同质买方的供应链系统,市场需求为价格弹性不确定需求,假设买方之间进行Cournot博弈,并和制造商进行Stackelberg博弈,建立了偏向制造商的的e-供应链模型。发现在偏向制造商的e-供应链中,制造商和买方的竞争优势增强;买方的数目增加,对制造商有利而对买方不利;第三方信息平台的佣金率增加时,制造商的收益减少;买方能接受的佣金率随其数目的增加而变小;最后通过算例对所得到的结论进行了验证。For single-manufacturer-multi-homogeneous-buyer supply chain system,based on market demand with price elasticity of uncertain demand,buyers follow Cournot game,and manufacturers follow Stackelberg game with buyers,a manufacturer-oriented electronic supply chain model is proposed.We found that manufacturers and buyers enhance their competitive advantage in vendor preferred e-supply chain,with the increase of buyers＇ number,manufacturers get benefit and buyers are disadvantaged.With the increase of commission rates of third-party information platform,manufacturers＇ revenue reduced.With the increase of its＇ number,buyers＇ acceptable commission rate is smaller,finally the availability of the conclusions in this paper are illustrated with practical examples.

关 键 词：Cournot博弈 STACKELBERG博弈 E-供应链 佣金率 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]