政策性农业保险中的保险公司激励机制研究  

Incentive mechanism on insurers for policy-sponsored agricultural insurance

作　　者：施红[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310058

出　　处：《保险研究》2010年第5期48-53,共6页Insurance Studies

摘　　要：中国政策性农业保险采取了"政府推动、市场运作"模式。保险公司的逐利性与政策性农业保险的非赢利性存在矛盾,并且政府与保险公司在政策性农业保险中形成委托代理关系。为了激发保险公司参与政策性农业保险的经营管理、控制保险公司道德风险,提高农业保险运作效率,应根据政府与保险公司的风险偏好,构建由低风险报酬和高风险报酬共同组成的激励机制。China has adopted the model of ＂government promotion and market-oriented operation＂ for the development of policy-sponsored agricultural insurance. There is an inherent contradiction between the profit-making nature of insurers and the non-profit making essence of policy-sponsored agricultural insurance, and the insurer forms an a- gency-principal relationship with government. In order to increase insurer＇s interest in the operation of agricultural insurance, curb insurer＇s moral hazards, and enhance operational efficiency, the paper suggested to establish an incentive mechanism composed of low-risk compensation and high-risk compensation according to the risk preference of government and insurance companies.

关 键 词：政策性农业保险 保险公司 激励 

分 类 号：F840.66[经济管理—保险]