股利政策选择对公司治理的监督作用分析  

Analysis of The Supervision of Dividend Policy Options on Corporate Governance

作　　者：吕沐熙[1] 伍伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学会计学院,长沙410079

出　　处：《学理论》2010年第15期59-60,共2页Theory Research

摘　　要：在现有的公司治理机制中,由于监事会的独立性和公正性难以得到保证,其所代理的监督职能在一定程度上受到损害,因此有必要依靠股利支付从外部约束代理人的行为。通过分析可知,现金股利对代理人行为的约束作用比股票股利更强。为了改善公司治理,委托人应该选择现金股利政策。In the current corporate governance mechanisms,the monitoring functions that agent by the board of supervisors subject to a certain degree of harm since the independence and impartiality of its are difficult to be assure.So it is necessary to restrain the behaviors of deputies through stock dividend distribution.This paper thinks that cash dividend has stricter restraint to the behaviors of deputies than stock dividend has,and puts forward that clients should select the cash dividend for the sake of corporate governance.

关 键 词：公司治理 股票股利 现金股利 

分 类 号：F721.2[经济管理—产业经济]