风险投资项目选择的信号传递博弈分析  

作　　者：陈丽珍[1] 梁菲[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学财经学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《特区经济》2010年第5期296-297,共2页Special Zone Economy

摘　　要：由于风险投资公司和申报项目的企业之间存在信息不对称而引起的逆向选择问题,本文提出运用信号传递博弈模型,即以商业计划书作为一种可靠的市场信号,将好项目和差项目区分开来。同时对避免逆向选择问题的发生提出了一些建议。As there is adverse selection problems which caused by information asymmetry between venture capital firms and the enterprises which report projects,This paper suggests a signaling game model which uses business plans as reliable market signals to help distinguish good projects from bad ones.Then it makes some recommendations on how to avoid the occurrence of adverse selection problems.

关 键 词：风险投资 信息不对称 逆向选择 信号传递博弈模型 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]