农户参与小额联保贷款的进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Farmers Involved in Micro-guaranteed Loans

作　　者：兰敏[1] 刘亚相[1] 王惠平[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北农林科技大学理学院,陕西杨凌712100

出　　处：《安徽农业科学》2010年第13期6997-6999,共3页Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences

摘　　要：当前我国农村联保贷款的发展遇到了困境,联保贷款率并没有如理论预期那样持续增长,而是时起时落变化很大。本文从联保贷款参与者的有限理性出发,利用进化博弈模型,分析与联保贷款密切联系的各因素,如贷款利率、贷款额度、连带责任、所投资项目风险的相关关系,求出农户自愿参与联保贷款的必要条件,并由此解释农户联保贷款过程中的演变进化路径。这些结论在指导农村信用社发放贷款和农户根据所投资项目风险的高低参与联保贷款团体方面有一定的参考价值。At present, the development of group lending in China’s rural area had encountered difficulties. The increasing rate was not rising well as expected, but down from time to time and changed greatly, using evolutionary game model, analysis various factors closely linked to such as loan interest rates, size of loan, joint liability, the risks of investment projects and the correlation between them were analyzed from the bounded rationality of participants. The necessary conditions of farmers voluntary participation guaranteed loans were found, and thus the evolutionary paths of farmers in that process were explained. These conclusions had a certain reference value in directing loans to rural credit cooperatives and farmers who participate the guaranteed loans according to the level of investment risk.

关 键 词：联保贷款 进化博弈模型 有限理性 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F323.8[经济管理—产业经济]