Tunneling, overlapping owner and investor protection： Evidence from merger and acquisition in Asia  

作　　者：Sumiyana Mas＇ud Machfoedz Ratna Candra Sari 

机构地区：[1]Faculty of Economics and Business, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta 55281, Indonesia [2]Faculty of Sosial and Economies, Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta 55281, Indonesia

出　　处：《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》2010年第5期46-60,共15页现代会计与审计（英文版）

摘　　要：Tunneling is to describe transfer resource out of the firm for benefit of their controlling shareholders. Better legal protection and stronger social norms improve minority shareholders＇ protection from expropriation. They consequently reduce the private benefits of controlling shareholders （La Porta, 1999）. This study aims to investigate tunneling in the context merger and acquisition （M＆A） and to examine whether tunneling occurs only in emerging markets with poor law enforcement or whether it also occurs in developed countries. This study documents that managers are more likely to overpay target in merger and acquisition with high overlapped owner which have stakes in bidder and target firm. That overpayment, a transfer of wealth from owners of bidder＇s firm to overlapping owners, is a type of tunneling. This study concludes that tunneling occurs in nations not only with low investor protection, but also with high investor protection.

关 键 词：TUNNELING EXPROPRIATION merger ＆ acquisition investor protection 

分 类 号：U455.4[建筑科学—桥梁与隧道工程] F271[交通运输工程—道路与铁道工程]