论垂直价格挤压下的接入定价规制  

Access-pricing Regulation under the Vertical Price-squeezing

作　　者：胡凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北经济学院财政与公共管理学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2010年第5期68-72,共5页Contemporary Economic Management

基　　金：湖北省教育厅科学研究计划项目(Q20091904);湖北经济学院青年科研项目(XJ2009006)

摘　　要：在自然垄断产业引入竞争的过程中,独占传输网络的纵向一体化垄断厂商可能对下游市场新进入者实施接入价格挤压。接入价格挤压从属于价格歧视。尽管一定条件下的接入价格挤压具有正向的竞争效应,但垄断厂商将具有同等效率或更高效率的独立厂商驱逐出市场则应该受到规制。接入价格规制包括政府直接规制定价和反垄断法间接规制定价。直接规制定价中整体价格上限较为可取,而反垄断法间接规制需要采用基于福利后果分析的合理推定原则,但从短期来看采用直接规制更有效率。最后提出了完善我国自然垄断产业接入定价规制的相关政策建议。During the process of the introducing competition in the natural monopoly industries,the monopoly firm which holds the network bottle-neck may put the access price-squeezing in practice.Access price-squeezing is a typical strategic behavior that belongs to price discrimination.Under given conditions,price-squeezing comes about positive-going competitive effect.Under certain conditions access price-squeezing has posi-tive competition effect.But if the monopoly firm excludes the ingoings which have the same or higher efficiency,it should be regulated.Access-pricing regulation concludes direct pricing regulation by government and indirect pricing regulation by Anti-trust Law.Finally the paper advises on access-pricing regulation about China’s natural monopoly industries.

关 键 词：瓶颈垄断 垂直价格挤压 接入定价规制 反垄断法 

分 类 号：F213.3[经济管理—国民经济]