区域竞争性趋同的博弈分析  

The Game Analysis of Regional Competitive Convergence

作　　者：徐辉[1] 李健[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081

出　　处：《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2010年第3期129-133,共5页Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：区域经济协调发展是中国经济社会发展的一个重要原则。当前区域经济发展中存在的竞争性趋同及重复投资等现象普遍存在,通过博弈分析发现产生这种现象的根本原因为区域竞争博弈的短期行为和区域主体考核制度的单一。通过假设,利用模型分别模拟计算了各种状态下的收益,利用合作博弈模型探索了区域长期合作需要满足的条件,验证了在资源禀赋存在差异的情况下打造"经济圈"是最优的政策选择,从而避免竞争性趋同,克服区域政府的短期行为,实现协同发展。Balanced development of regional economy is a crucial principal of China＇s economic and social development.In the current regional economic development,such phenomena as competitive convergence and repeated investment,are widespread.An analysis based on the game theory shows that the basic causes of those phenomena are short-term behavior in the competitive game and the singularity of regional main appraisal system.Via assumption,this paper employs a model to simulate various circumstances and compute the corresponding profits,and make use of the cooperative game model to explore the conditions that need to be met in regional long-term cooperation,and verify that when there is difference in resources,＂Economic Circle＂ is the best policy to be chosen so as to avoid competitive convergence,overcome short-term behavior of regional governments,and achieve coordinated development.

关 键 词：竞争性趋同 差异化 合作博弈 非合作博弈 重复博弈 

分 类 号：F061.5[经济管理—政治经济学]