中国与欧盟市场经济地位谈判策略——基于重复博弈模型的分析  

Negotiation between China and EU about Non-Market Economy Status

作　　者：冯宗宪[1] 林龙辉[1] 向洪金[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061 [2]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2010年第3期19-24,共6页Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70173012);国家"985工程"二期建设项目(07200701)

摘　　要：近年来,非市场经济地位成为中国出口产品遭遇反倾销等贸易摩擦事件的重要原因,而欧盟既是中国最重要的贸易伙伴,也是对中国提出反倾销最多的国家和地区,为此,利用重复博弈模型从动态视角对中国与欧盟市场经济地位谈判中双方谈判的可行性、谈判的模式以及双方的收益和策略选择进行了深入分析。得到的主要结论是,中欧之间的非市场经济地位谈判带给双边的收益是不对称的,对中国来说,越早得到欧盟的承认,收益越大;对欧盟来说,在一开始就给予中国市场经济地位不是其最优选择,然而随着时间的推移,非市场经济地位谈判的价值将减小,而欧盟所承担的机会成本将上升。Over past years, the non-market economy status has become one of main reasons for antidumping or anti-subsidy events suffered by Chinese exported products. EU is not only the most important trade partner of China, but also a region where antidumping measures against China are taken by most countries. For this end, by use of the repeated game models and from the dynamic viewpoint angle, the paper has made a profound analysis on the negotiation feasibility and patterns, and the profit and strategy selectivity between two parties. The main conclusion arrived at is that the two-party profit of the negotiation about the non-market economic status between China and EU is asymmetric. As for China, the earlier the recognition of the non-market economic status by EU, the greater the yield. As for EU, it is not the optimal choice to give China the non-market economic status from the very beginning. However, as time goes on, the value of the negotiation of the non-market economic status will diminish, and the opportunity cost assumed by EU will rise.

关 键 词：非市场经济地位 重复博弈 策略选择 

分 类 号：F741[经济管理—国际贸易]